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This paper is the second in a series of three papers. All three papers
deal with interpretability logics and related matters. In the first paper a
construction method was exposed to obtain models of these logics. Using
this method, we obtained some completeness results, some already known,
and some new.
In this paper, we will set the construction method to work to obtain
more results. First, the modal completeness of the logic ILM is proved
using the construction method. This is not a new result, but by using our
new proof we can obtain new results. Among these new results are some
admissible rules for ILM and GL.
Moreover, the new proof will be used to classify all the essentially
∆1 and also all the essentially Σ1 formulas of ILM. Closely related to
essentially Σ1 sentences are the so-called self provers. A self-prover is
a formula ϕ which implies its own provability, that is ϕ → ✷ϕ. Each
formula ϕ will generate a self prover ϕ∧✷ϕ. We will use the construction
method to characterize those sentences of GL that generate a self prover
that is trivial in the sense that it is Σ1.
1 Introduction
Mathematical interpretations occur everywhere in (meta) mathematical prac-
tice. Interpretability logics study structural behavior of interpretations. One
such logic, the logic ILM, describes the structural behavior of interpretations
over theories like Peano Arithmetic. In this paper we shall first study this lo-
gic ILM and then use our findings to derive new results mainly related to Σ1
sentences of theories like Peano Arithmetic.
This paper is the second in a series of three. For more background on inter-
pretations and their corresponding logics we refer to the first part of this paper
[20]. Also, all definitions used in this paper occur with some motivation and
background in [20]. For completeness, self-containenedness and for readability
we shall include a short recap in this paper of those technicalities that were
introduced in [20] and that are central to this paper.
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2 A concise recap: central notions of this paper
In this paper we shall heavily resort to some rather technical results obtained in
[20]. In particular, certain parts of proofs in [20] shall be re-used here. In this
section, we shall state those parts of that paper which are necessary for results
further on.
2.1 Interpretability logics
The modal sentences in this paper are mostly in the language of interpretability
which is defined as follows.
FormIL := ⊥ | Prop | (FormIL → FormIL) | (✷FormIL) | (FormIL ✄ FormIL)
Here Prop is a countable set of propositional variables p, q, r, s, t, p0, p1, . . ..
We employ the usual definitions of the logical operators ¬,∨,∧ and ↔. Also
shall we write ✸ϕ for ¬✷¬ϕ. Formulas that start with a ✷ are called box-
formulas or ✷-formulas. Likewise we talk of ✸-formulas.
For standard reading conventions on bracketing please refer to [20].
The basic interpretability logic is called IL and is captured in the following
definition.
Definition 2.1. The logic IL is the smallest set of formulas being closed under
the rules of Necessitation and of Modus Ponens, that contains all tautological
formulas and all instantiations of the following axiom schemata.
L1 ✷(A→ B)→ (✷A→ ✷B)
L2 ✷A→ ✷✷A
L3 ✷(✷A→ A)→ ✷A
J1 ✷(A→ B)→ A✄B
J2 (A✄B) ∧ (B ✄ C)→ A✄ C
J3 (A✄ C) ∧ (B ✄ C)→ A ∨B ✄ C
J4 A✄B → (✸A→ ✸B)
J5 ✸A✄A
We will write IL ⊢ ϕ for ϕ ∈ IL. If X is a set of axiom schemata we will
denote by ILX the logic that arises by adding the axiom schemata in X to IL.
Go¨del Lo¨b’s logic GL is obtained from IL by omitting all the J axioms and not
allowing the ✄ modality in the language.
The standard semantics for interpretability logics are given by the following
definitions.
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Definition 2.2. An IL-frame is a triple 〈W,R, S〉. Here W is a non-empty
countable universe, R is a binary relation on W and S is a set of binary re-
lations on W , indexed by elements of W . The R and S satisfy the following
requirements.
1. R is conversely well-founded1
2. xRy & yRz → xRz
3. ySxz → xRy & xRz
4. xRy → ySxy
5. xRyRz → ySxz
6. uSxvSxw → uSxw
IL-frames are sometimes also called Veltman frames. We will on occasion
speak of R or Sx transitions instead of relations. If we write ySz, we shall mean
that ySxz for some x. W is sometimes called the universe, or domain, of the
frame and its elements are referred to as worlds or nodes. With x↾ we shall
denote the set {y ∈ W | xRy}. We will often represent S by a ternary relation
in the canonical way, writing 〈x, y, z〉 for ySxz.
Definition 2.3. An IL-model is a quadruple 〈W,R, S,〉. Here 〈W,R, S, 〉 is
an IL-frame and  is a subset of W × Prop. We write w  p for 〈w, p〉 ∈ . As
usual,  is extended to a subset ˜ of W × FormIL by demanding the following.
• w˜p iff w  p for p ∈ Prop
• w 6 ˜⊥
• w˜A→ B iff w 6 ˜A or w˜B
• w˜✷A iff ∀v (wRv ⇒ v˜A)
• w˜A✄B iff ∀u (wRu ∧ u˜A⇒ ∃v (uSwv˜B))
Note that ˜ is completely determined by . Thus we will denote ˜ also by
. It is an easy observation that the truth of a modal formula in a particular
world in the model is completely determined by the part of the model that
“can be seen”from that world. This observation is used often and therefore we
explicitly restate it here.
Definition 2.4 (Generated Submodel). Let M = 〈W,R, S,〉 be an IL-model
and let m ∈M . We define m↾∗ to be the set {x ∈ W | x=m∨mRx}. By M↾m
we denote the submodel generated by m defined as follows.
M↾m := 〈m↾∗, R ∩ (m↾∗)2,
⋃
x∈m↾∗
Sx ∩ (m↾∗)
2, ∩(m↾ ∗ ×Prop)〉
1A relation R on W is called conversely well-founded if every non-empty subset of W has
an R-maximal element.
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Lemma 2.5 (Generated Submodel Lemma). Let M be an IL-model and let
m ∈M . For all formulas ϕ and all x ∈ m↾∗ we have that
M↾m,x  ϕ iff M,x  ϕ.
In [20] models are built by gluing sets of modal sentences together. We shall
briefly recapitulate the main definitions of those sets of sentences here.
Definition 2.6. A set Γ is ILX-consistent iff Γ 6⊢ILX ⊥. An ILX-consistent set
is maximal ILX-consistent if for any ϕ, either ϕ ∈ Γ or ¬ϕ ∈ Γ.
We will often abbreviate “maximal consistent set” by MCS and refrain from
explicitly mentioning the logic ILX when the context allows us to do so. We
define three useful relations on MCS’s, the successor relation ≺, the C-critical
successor relation ≺C and the Box-inclusion relation ⊆✷.
Definition 2.7. Let Γ and ∆ denote maximal ILX-consistent sets.
• Γ ≺ ∆ := ✷A ∈ Γ⇒ A,✷A ∈ ∆
• Γ ≺C ∆ := A✄ C ∈ Γ⇒ ¬A,✷¬A ∈ ∆
• Γ ⊆✷ ∆ := ✷A ∈ Γ⇒ ✷A ∈ ∆
It is clear that Γ ≺C ∆ ⇒ Γ ≺ ∆. For, if ✷A ∈ Γ then ¬A ✄ ⊥ ∈ Γ. Also
⊥ ✄ C ∈ Γ, whence ¬A ✄ C ∈ Γ. If now Γ ≺C ∆ then A,✷A ∈ ∆, whence
Γ ≺ ∆. It is also clear that Γ ≺C ∆ ≺ ∆
′ ⇒ Γ ≺C ∆
′.
Lemma 2.8. Let Γ and ∆ denote maximal ILX-consistent sets. We have Γ ≺ ∆
iff Γ ≺⊥ ∆.
2.2 The construction method and the Main Lemma
The main purpose of [20] was to provide some background in the modal theory
of provability logics. Moreover, in that paper, a construction method was devel-
oped. The construction method provided a way of gluing sets of modal sentences
together as to obtain models with desired properties. The ideas involved are
quite similar to the definition of canonical models with the exception that the
model is constructed step by step rather than defined at once and, moreover,
only that part of the model that you need is constructed and nothing more.
Thus, the building blocks are maximal consistent sets of modal interpretabi-
lity logics. Instead of gluing these sets together outright, we shall glue variables
u, v, . . . together and label these variables by the sets. We denote the labeling
by ν. Thus, if we added a new element x, by ν(x) we refer to the corresponding
set of modal sentences. Likewise, certain R transitions will be labeled via ν with
a single formula, for example ν(〈x, y〉) = C.
The following two notions are central to the construction method. As they
are so central to the paper we strongly advice the reader who is novice to this
field to read the motivation of these notions in Section 3 of [20].
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Definition 2.9. Let x be a world in some ILX-labeled frame 〈W,R, S, ν〉. The
C-critical cone above x, we write CCx , is defined inductively as
• ν(〈x, y〉) = C ⇒ y ∈ CCx
• x′ ∈ CCx & x
′Sxy ⇒ y ∈ C
C
x
• x′ ∈ CCx & x
′Ry ⇒ y ∈ CCx
Definition 2.10. Let x be a world in some ILX-labeled frame 〈W,R, S, ν〉. The
generalized C-cone above x, we write GCx , is defined inductively as
• y ∈ CCx ⇒ y ∈ G
C
x
• x′ ∈ GCx & x
′Swz ⇒ z ∈ G
C
x for arbitrary w
• x′ ∈ GCx & x
′Ry ⇒ y ∈ GCx
The construction method in essence deals step by step with existential re-
quirements – so-called problems– and with universal requirements – so-called
deficiencies – both defined below.
Definition 2.11 (Problems). Let D be some set of sentences. A D-problem is
a pair 〈x,¬(A✄B)〉 such that ¬(A✄B) ∈ ν(x)∩D and for no y ∈ CBx we have
A ∈ ν(y).
Definition 2.12 (Deficiencies). Let D be some set of sentences and let F =
〈W,R, S, ν〉 be an ILX-labeled frame. A D-deficiency is a triple 〈x, y, C ✄ D〉
with xRy, C ✄ D ∈ ν(x) ∩ D, and C ∈ ν(y), but for no z with ySxz we have
D ∈ ν(z).
If the set D is clear or fixed, we will just speak about problems and defi-
ciencies. The labeled frames we will construct are always supposed to satisfy
some minimal reasonable requirements. We summarize these in the notion of
adequacy.
Definition 2.13 (Adequate frames). A frame is called adequate if the following
conditions are satisfied.
1. xRy ⇒ ν(x) ≺ ν(y)
2. A 6= B ⇒ GAx ∩ G
B
x = ∅
3. y ∈ CAx ⇒ ν(x) ≺A ν(y)
We need three more technical definitions before we can re-state the Main
Lemma.
Definition 2.14. LetD be some set of formulas and letM be an interpretability
model. We say that a Truth-Lemma holds on M with respect to D if for all x
in M we have that
∀ϕ∈D [x  ϕ iff. ϕ ∈ x].
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Definition 2.15 (Depth). The depth of a finite frame F , we will write depth(F )
is the maximal length of sequences of the form x0R . . . Rxn. (For convenience
we define max(∅) = 0.)
Definition 2.16 (Union of Bounded Chains). An indexed set {Fi}i∈ω of labeled
frames is called a chain if for all i, Fi ⊆ Fi+1. It is called a bounded chain if
for some number n, depth(Fi) ≤ n for all i ∈ ω. The union of a bounded chain
{Fi}i∈ω of labeled frames Fi is defined as follows.
∪i∈ωFi := 〈∪i∈ωWi,∪i∈ωRi,∪i∈ωSi,∪i∈ωνi〉
Finally the Main Lemma can be formulated.
Lemma 2.17 (Main Lemma). Let ILX be an interpretability logic and let C be
a (first or higher order) frame condition such that for any IL-frame F we have
F |= C ⇒ F |= X.
Let D be a finite set of sentences. Let I be a set of so-called invariants of labeled
frames so that we have the following properties.
• F |= IU ⇒ F |= C, where IU is that part of I that is closed under bounded
unions of labeled frames.
• I contains the following invariant: xRy → ∃A∈(ν(y) \ ν(x)) ∩ {✷¬D | D
a subformula of some B ∈ D}.
• For any adequate labeled frame F , satisfying all the invariants, we have
the following.
– Any D-problem of F can be eliminated by extending F in a way that
conserves all invariants.
– Any D-deficiency of F can be eliminated by extending F in a way
that conserves all invariants.
In case such a set of invariants I exists, we have that any ILX-labeled ade-
quate frame F satisfying all the invariants can be extended to some labeled ade-
quate ILX-frame Fˆ on which a truth-lemma with respect to D holds.
Moreover, if for any finite D that is closed under subformulas and single
negations, a corresponding set of invariants I can be found as above and such
that moreover I holds on any one-point labeled frame, we have that ILX is a
complete logic.
The following two lemmata indicate how problems and deficiencies can be
dealt with.
Lemma 2.18. Let Γ be a maximal ILX-consistent set such that ¬(A✄B) ∈ Γ.
Then there exists a maximal ILX-consistent set ∆ such that Γ ≺B ∆ ∋ A,✷¬A.
Lemma 2.19. Consider C ✄ D ∈ Γ ≺B ∆ ∋ C. There exists ∆
′ with Γ ≺B
∆′ ∋ D,✷¬D.
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2.3 Modal Completeness of IL
In [20] the first application of the construction method was reproving the modal
completeness of IL. Large parts of this new completeness for IL can be re-used
in other proofs. We mention here the ingredients of the completeness proof of
IL that will be re-used in this paper.
The Main Lemma will basically add bits and pieces to a model until all the
necessary requirements are met. By adding a bit to a labeled frame a structure
will arise that is almost a new frame but not quite yet. Those structures are
called quasi frames and are defined below.
Definition 2.20. A quasi-frame G is a quadruple 〈W,R, S, ν〉. Here W is a
non-empty set of worlds, and R a binary relation on W . S is a set of binary
relations on W indexed by elements of W . The ν is a labeling as defined on
labeled frames. Critical cones and generalized cones are defined just in the same
way as in the case of labeled frames. G should posess the following properties.
1. R is conversely well-founded
2. ySxz → xRy & xRz
3. xRy → ν(x) ≺ ν(y)
4. A 6= B → GAx ∩ G
B
x = ∅
5. y∈CAx → ν(x) ≺A ν(y)
Once the Main Lemma is around, the main effort in the proof of the modal
completeness of IL lies in showing that each quasi frame can be extended to ade-
quate labeled frame. We restate here this fact and hint at the main ingredients
of the proof.
Lemma 2.21 (IL-closure). Let G = 〈W,R, S, ν〉 be a quasi-frame. There is an
adequate IL-frame F extending G. That is, F = 〈W,R′, S′, ν〉 with R ⊆ R′ and
S ⊆ S′.
Bewijs. We define an imperfection on a quasi-frame Fn to be a tuple γ having
one of the following forms.
(i) γ = 〈0, a, b, c〉 with Fn |= aRbRc but Fn 6|= aRc
(ii) γ = 〈1, a, b〉 with Fn |= aRb but Fn 6|= bSab
(iii) γ = 〈2, a, b, c, d〉 with Fn |= bSacSad but not Fn |= bSad
(iv) γ = 〈3, a, b, c〉 with Fn |= aRbRc but Fn 6|= bSac
Now let us start with a quasi-frame G = 〈W,R, S, ν〉. We will define a chain of
quasi-frames. Every new element in the chain will have at least one imperfection
less than its predecessor. The union will have no imperfections at all. It will be
our required adequate IL-frame.
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3 The Logic ILM
Let us first recall the principle M, also called Montagna’s principle.
M : A✄B → A ∧ ✷C ✄B ∧ ✷C
The modal logic ILM is of importance because it is the interpretability logic
of theories like Peano Arithmetic.
Theorem 3.1 (Berarducci [3], Shavrukov [24]). If T is an essentially reflexive
theory, then IL(T) = ILM.
The modal completeness of ILM was proved by de Jongh and Veltman in
[8]. In this section we will reprove the modal completeness of the logic ILM via
the Main Lemma. This is done in 3.1 and 3.2. In 3.3 the new completeness
proof is used to obtain some new results on admissible rules of ILM.
The general approach to the new completeness proof of ILM is not much
different from the completeness proof for IL. The novelty consists of incorpora-
ting the ILM frame condition, that is, whenever ySxzRu holds, we should also
have yRu. In this case, adequacy imposes ν(y) ≺ ν(u).
Thus, whenever we introduce an Sx relation, when eliminating a deficiency,
we should keep in mind that in a later stage, this Sx can activate the ILM frame
condition. It turns out to be sufficient to demand ν(y) ⊆✷ ν(z) whenever ySz.
Also, we should do some additional book keeping as to keep our critical cones
fit to our purposes.
3.1 Preparations
We start by defining a frame condition for ILM.
Definition 3.2. An ILM-frame is a frame such that ySxzRu→ yRu holds on
it. A(n adequate) labeled ILM-frame is a labeled ILM-frame on which ySxz →
ν(y) ⊆✷ ν(z) holds. We call ySxzRu→ yRu the frame condition of ILM.
The next lemma tells us that the frame condition of ILM, indeed characte-
rizes the frames of ILM.
Lemma 3.3. F |= ∀x, y, u, v (ySxuRv→ yRv)⇔ F |= ILM
We will now introduce a notion of a quasi-ILM-frame and a corresponding
closure lemma. In order to get an ILM-closure lemma in analogy with Lemma
2.21 we need to introduce a technicality.
Definition 3.4. The A-critical M-cone of x, we write MAx , is defined inducti-
vely as follows.
• xRAy → y ∈MAx
• y ∈MAx & yRz → z ∈ M
A
x
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• y ∈MAx & ySxz → z ∈ M
A
x
• y ∈MAx & yS
truRv→ v ∈MAx
Definition 3.5. A quasi-frame is a quasi-ILM-frame if2 the following properties
hold.
• Rtr;Str is conversely well-founded3
• ySxz → ν(y) ⊆✷ ν(z)
• y ∈MAx ⇒ ν(x) ≺A ν(y)
It is easy to see that CAx ⊆ M
A
x ⊆ G
A
x . Thus we have that A 6= B →
MAx ∩M
B
x = ∅. Also, it is clear that if F is an ILM-frame, then F |=M
A
x = C
A
x .
Actually we have that a quasi-ILM-frame F is an ILM-frame iff F |=MAx = C
A
x .
Lemma 3.6 (ILM-closure). Let G = 〈W,R, S, ν〉 be a quasi-ILM-frame. There
is an adequate ILM-frame F extending G. That is, F = 〈W,R′, S′, ν〉 with
R ⊆ R′ and S ⊆ S′.
Bewijs. The proof is very similar to that of Lemma 2.21. As a matter of fact,
we will use large parts of the latter proof in here. For quasi-ILM-frames we also
define the notion of an imperfection. An imperfection on a quasi-ILM-frame Fn
is a tuple γ that is either an imperfection on the quasi-frame Fn, or it is a tuple
of the form
γ = 〈4, a, b, c, d〉 with Fn |= bSacRd but Fn 6|= bRd.
As in the closure proof for quasi-frames, we define a chain of quasi-ILM-frames.
Each new frame in the chain will have at least one imperfection less than its
predecessor. We only have to consider the new imperfections, in which case we
define
Fn+1 := 〈Wn, Rn ∪ {〈b, d〉}, Sn, νn〉.
We now see by an easy but elaborate induction that every Fn is a quasi-ILM-
frame. Again, this boils down to checking that at each of (i)-(v), all the eight
properties from Definition 3.5 are preserved.
During the closure process, the critical cones do change. However, the critical
M-cones are invariant. Thus, it is useful to prove
8′. Fn+1 |= y ∈ M
A
x iff Fn |= y ∈M
A
x .
2By Rtr we denote the transitive closure of R, inductively defined as the smallest set such
that xRy → xRtry and ∃z (xRtrz ∧ zRtry) → xRtry). Similarly we define Str. The ; is the
composition operator on relations. Thus, for example, y(Rtr ;S)z iff there is a u such that
yRtru and uSz. Recall that uSv iff uSxv for some x. In the literature one often also uses
the ◦ notation, where xR ◦ Sy iff ∃z xSzRy. Note that Rtr ;Str is conversely well-founded iff
Rtr ◦ Str is conversely well-founded.
3In the case of quasi-frames we did not need a second order frame condition. We could use
the second order frame condition of IL via ySxz → xRy & xRz. Such a trick seems not to be
available here.
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Our induction is completely straightforward. As an example we shall see that
8′ holds in Case (i): We have eliminated an imperfection concerning the transi-
tivity of the R relation and Fn+1 := 〈Wn, Rn ∪ {〈a, c〉}, Sn, νn〉.
To see that 8′ holds, we reason as follows. Suppose Fn+1 |= y ∈ M
A
x . Thus
∃z1, . . . , zl (0 ≤ l) with
4 Fn+1 |= xR
Az1(Sx ∪ R ∪ (S
tr;R))z2, . . . , zl(Sx ∪ R ∪
(Str;R))y. We transform the sequence z1, . . . , zl into a sequence u1, . . . , um
(0 ≤ m) in the following way. Every occurrence of aRc in z1, . . . , zl is replaced
by aRbRc. In case that for some n < l we have znS
traRc = zn+1, we replace
zn, zn+1 by zn, b, c and thus zn(S
tr;R)bRc. We leave the rest of the sequence
z1, . . . , zl unchanged. Clearly Fn |= xR
Au1(Sx ∪ R ∪ (S
tr;R))u2, . . . , um(Sx ∪
R ∪ (Str;R))y, whence Fn |= y ∈ M
A
x .
We shall include one more example for Case (v): We have eliminated an im-
perfection concerning the ILM frame-condition and Fn+1 := 〈Wn, Rn∪{〈b, d〉}, Sn, νn〉.
To see the conversely well-foundedness of R, we reason as follows. Suppose for
a contradiction that there is an infinite sequence such that Fn+1 |= x1Rx2R . . ..
We now get an infinite sequence y1, y2, . . . by replacing every occurrence of bRd
in x1, x2, . . . by bSacRd and leaving the rest unchanged. If there are infinitely
many Sa-transitions in the sequence y1, y2, . . . (note that there are certainly
infinitely many R-transitions in y1, y2, . . .), we get a contradiction with our as-
sumption that Rtr;Str is conversely well-founded on Fn. In the other case we
get a contradiction with the conversely well-foundedness of R on Fn.
Once we have seen that indeed, every Fn is a quasi-ILM-frame, it is not hard
to see that F := ∪i∈ωFi is the required adequate ILM-frame. To this extend
we have to check a list of properties (a.)-(n.). The properties (a.)-(l.) are as in
the proof of Lemma 2.21.
The one exception is Property (d.). To see (d.), the conversely well-foundedness
of R, we prove by induction on n that Fn |= xRy iff F0 |= x(S
tr,refl;Rtr)y. Thus,
a hypothetical infinite sequence F |= x0Rx1Rx2R . . . defines an infinite sequence
F0 |= x0(S
tr,refl;Rtr)x1(S
tr,refl;Rtr)x2 . . ., which contradicts either the conversely
well-foundedness of R or of Str;Rtr on F0.
The only new properties in this list are (m.) : uSxvRw → uRw and (n.) :
ySxz → ν(y) ⊆✷ ν(z), but they are easily seen to hold on F .
Again do we note that the closure obtained in Lemma 3.6 is unique. Thus we
can refer to the ILM-closure of a quasi-ILM-frame. All the information about
the labels can be dropped in Definition 3.5 and Lemma 3.6 to obtain a lemma
about regular ILM-frames.
Corollary 3.7. Let D be a finite set of sentences, closed under subformulas
and single negations. Let G = 〈W,R, S, ν〉 be a quasi-ILM-frame on which
xRy → ∃A∈((ν(y) \ ν(x)) ∩ {✷D | D ∈ D}) (∗)
holds. Property (∗) does also hold on the IL-closure F of G.
4The union operator on relations can just be seen as the set-theoretical union. Thus, for
example, y(Sx ∪ R)z iff ySxz or yRz.
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Bewijs. The proof is as the proof of Corollary 5.3 from [20]. We only need to
remark on Case (v): If bSacRd, we have ν(b) ⊆✷ ν(c). Thus, A ∈ ((ν(d)\ν(c))∩
{✷D | D ∈ D}) implies A 6∈ ν(b).
The final lemma in our preparations is a lemma that is needed to eliminate
deficiencies properly.
Lemma 3.8. Let Γ and ∆ be maximal ILM-consistent sets. Consider C ✄D ∈
Γ ≺B ∆ ∋ C. There exists a maximal ILM-consistent set ∆
′ with Γ ≺B ∆
′ ∋
D,✷¬D and ∆ ⊆✷ ∆
′.
Bewijs. By compactness and by commutation of boxes and conjunctions, it is
sufficient to show that for any formula ✷E ∈ ∆ there is a ∆′′ with Γ ≺B
∆′′ ∋ D ∧ ✷E ∧ ✷¬D. As C ✄D is in the maximal ILM-consistent set Γ, also
C∧✷E✄D∧✷E ∈ Γ. Clearly C∧✷E ∈ ∆, whence, by Lemma 2.19 we find a ∆′′
with Γ ≺B ∆
′′ ∋ D∧✷E∧✷(¬D∨¬✷E). As ILM ⊢ ✷E∧✷(¬D∨¬✷E)→ ✷¬D,
we see that also D ∧ ✷E ∧ ✷¬D ∈ ∆′′.
3.2 Completeness
Theorem 3.9. ILM is a complete logic.
Bewijs. Frame Condition In the case of ILM the frame condition is easy and
well known, as expressed in Lemma 3.3.
Invariants Let D be a finite set of sentences closed under subformulas and
single negations. We define a corresponding set of invariants.
I :=
{
xRy → ∃A∈((ν(y) \ ν(x)) ∩ {✷D | D ∈ D})
uSxvRw→ uRw
Elimination Thus, we consider an ILM-labeled frame F := 〈W,R, S, ν〉
that satisfies the invariants.
Problems Any problem 〈a,¬(A✄B)〉 of F will be eliminated in two steps.
1. Using Lemma 2.18 we can find a MCS ∆ with ν(a) ≺B ∆ ∋ A,✷¬A. We
fix some b /∈W and define
G′ := 〈W ∪ {b}, R ∪ {〈a, b〉}, S, ν ∪ {〈b,∆〉, 〈〈a, b〉, B〉}〉.
We now see that G′ is a quasi-ILM-frame. Thus, we need to check the
eight points from Definitions 3.5 and 2.20. We will comment on some of
these points.
To see, for example, Point 4, C 6= D → GCx ∩ G
D
x = ∅, we reason as
follows. First, we notice that ∀x, y∈W [G′ |= y ∈ GCx iff F |= y ∈ G
C
x ]
holds for any C. Suppose G′ |= GCx ∩ G
D
x 6= ∅. If G
′ |= b /∈ GCx ∩ G
D
x ,
then also F |= GCx ∩ G
D
x 6= ∅. As F is an ILM-frame, it is certainly a
11
quasi-ILM-frame, whence C = D. If now G′ |= b ∈ GCx ∩ G
D
x , necessarily
G′ |= a ∈ GCx ∩ G
D
x , whence F |= a ∈ G
C
x ∩ G
D
x and C = D.
To see Requirement 8, y ∈ MEx → ν(x) ≺E ν(y), we reason as follows.
Again, we first note that ∀x, y∈W [G′ |= y ∈ MCx iff F |= y ∈M
C
x ] holds
for any C. We only need to consider the new element, that is, b ∈ MEx .
If x = a and E = B, we get the property by choice of ν(b).
For x 6= a, we consider two cases. Either a ∈ MEx or a /∈ M
E
x . In the
first case, we get by the fact that F is a labeled ILM-frame ν(x) ≺E ν(a).
But ν(a) ≺ ν(b), whence ν(x) ≺E ν(b). In the second necessarily for
some a′ ∈ MEx we have a
′Stra. But now ν(a′) ⊆✷ ν(a). Clearly ν(x) ≺E
ν(a′) ⊆✷ ν(a) ≺ ν(b)→ ν(x) ≺E ν(b).
2. With Lemma 3.6 we extend G′ to an adequate labeled ILM-frame G.
It is now obvious that both of the invariants hold on G. The first one
holds due to Corollary 3.7. The other is just included in the definition of
ILM-frames. Obviously, 〈a,¬(A✄B)〉 is not a problem any more in G.
Deficiencies. Again, any deficiency 〈a, b, C ✄D〉 in F will be eliminated in
two steps.
1. We first define B to be the formula such that b ∈ CBa . If such a B does
not exist, we take B to be ⊥. Note that if such a B does exist, it must
be unique by Property 4 of Definition 2.20. By Lemma 2.8, or just by the
fact that F is an ILM-frame, we have that ν(a) ≺B ν(b).
By Lemma 3.8 we can now find a ∆′ such that ν(a) ≺B ∆
′ ∋ D,✷¬D and
ν(b) ⊆✷ ∆
′. We fix some c 6∈ W and define
G′ := 〈W,R ∪ {〈a, c〉}, S ∪ {〈a, b, c〉}, ν ∪ {〈c,∆′〉}〉.
To see that G′ is indeed a quasi-ILM-frame, again eight properties should
be checked. But all of these are fairly routine.
For Property 4 it is good to remark that, if c ∈ GAx , then necessarily b ∈ G
A
x
or a ∈ GAx .
To see Property 8, we reason as follows. We only need to consider c ∈MAx .
This is possible if x = a and b ∈ MAa , or if for some y ∈ M
A
x we have
yStra, or if a ∈ MAx . In the first case, we get that b ∈ M
A
a , and thus also
b ∈ CAa as F is an ILM-frame. Thus, by Property 4, we see that A = B.
But ∆′ was chosen such that ν(a) ≺B ∆
′. In the second case we see that
ν(x) ≺A ν(y) ⊆✷ ν(a) ≺ ν(c) whence ν(x) ≺A ν(c). In the third case we
have ν(x) ≺A ν(a) ≺ ν(c), whence ν(x) ≺A ν(c).
2. Again, G′ is closed off under the frame conditions with Lemma 3.6. Clearly,
〈a, b, C ✄D〉 is not a deficiency on G.
Rounding upOne of our invariants is just the ILM frame condition. Clearly
this invariant is preserved under taking unions of bounded chains. The closure
satisfies the invariants.
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3.3 Admissible rules
With the completeness at hand, a lot of reasoning about ILM gets easier. This
holds in particular for derived/admissible rules of ILM. In the following lemma,
we will use the completeness theorem to obtain models. Most of the times these
models will be glued above a fresh new world to obtain new models with the
desired properties.
Lemma 3.10.
(i) ILM ⊢ ✷A⇔ ILM ⊢ A
(ii) ILM ⊢ ✷A ∨ ✷B ⇔ ILM ⊢ ✷A or ILM ⊢ ✷B
(iii) ILM ⊢ A✄B ⇔ ILM ⊢ A→ B ∨✸B.
(iv) ILM ⊢ A✄B ⇔ ILM ⊢ ✸A→ ✸B
(v) Let Ai be formulae such that ILM 6⊢ ¬Ai. Then
ILM ⊢
∧
✸Ai → A✄B ⇔ ILM ⊢ A✄B.
(vi) ILM ⊢ A ∨✸A⇔ ILM ⊢ ✷⊥ → A
(vii) ILM ⊢ ⊤✄A⇔ ILM ⊢ ✷⊥ → A
Bewijs. (i). ILM ⊢ A⇒ ILM ⊢ ✷A by necessitation. Now suppose ILM ⊢ ✷A.
We want to see ILM ⊢ A. Thus, we take an arbitrary model M = 〈W,R, S,〉
and world m ∈ M . If there is an m0 with M |= m0Rm, then M,m0  ✷A,
whence M,m  A. If there is no such m0, we define (we may assume m0 /∈ W )
M ′ := 〈W ∪ {m0}, R ∪ {〈m0, w〉 | w ∈ W},
S ∪ {〈m0, x, y〉 | 〈x, y〉 ∈ R or x=y ∈W},〉.
Clearly, M ′ is an ILM-model too (the ILM frame conditions in the new cases
follows from the transitivity of R), whence M ′,m0  ✷A and thus M
′,m  A.
By the construction of M ′ and by Lemma 2.5 we also get M,m  A.
(ii).”⇐” is easy. For the other direction we assume ILM 6⊢ ✷A and ILM 6⊢
✷B and set out to prove ILM 6⊢ ✷A ∨ ✷B. By our assumption and by com-
pleteness, we find M0,m0  ✸¬A and M1,m1  ✸¬B. We define (for some
r /∈W0 ∪W1)
M := 〈W0 ∪W1 ∪ {r}, R0 ∪R1 ∪ {〈r, x〉 | x ∈W0 ∪W1},
S0 ∪ S1 ∪ {〈r, x, y〉 | x=y∈W0 ∪W1 or 〈x, y〉∈R0 or 〈x, y〉∈R1},〉.
Now, M is an ILM-model and M, r  ✸¬A ∧✸¬B as is easily seen by Lemma
2.5. By soundness we get ILM 6⊢ ✷A ∨ ✷B.
(iii).”⇐” goes as follows. ⊢ A→ B ∨✸B ⇒⊢ ✷(A→ B ∨✸B)⇒⊢ A✄B ∨
✸B ⇒⊢ A✄B. For the other direction, suppose that 6⊢ A→ B∨✸B. Thus, we
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can find a model M = 〈W,R, S,〉 and m ∈ M with M,m  A ∧ ¬B ∧ ✷¬B.
We now define (with r /∈W )
M ′ := 〈W ∪ {r}, R ∪ {〈r, x〉 | x=m or 〈m,x〉 ∈ R},
S ∪ {〈r, x, y〉 | (x=y and (〈m,x〉∈R or x=m)) or 〈m,x〉, 〈x, y〉∈R},〉.
It is easy to see thatM ′ is an ILM-model. By Lemma 2.5 we see thatM ′, x  ϕ
iff M,x  ϕ for x ∈ W . It is also not hard to see that M ′, r  ¬(A ✄ B). For,
we have rRm  A. By definition, mSry → (m=y ∨mRy) whence y 6 B.
(iv). By the J4 axiom, we get one direction for free. For the other direction
we reason as follows. Suppose ILM 0 A ✄ B. Then we can find a model
M = 〈W,R, S,〉 and a world l such thatM, l  ¬(A✄B). AsM, l ⊢ ¬(A✄B),
w can find some m ∈ M with lRm  A ∧ ¬B ∧ ✷¬B. We now define (with
r /∈W )
M ′ := 〈W ∪ {r}, R ∪ {〈r, x〉 | x=m or 〈m,x〉 ∈ R},
S ∪ {〈r, x, y〉 | (x=y and (〈m,x〉∈R or x=m)) or 〈m,x〉, 〈x, y〉∈R},〉.
It is easy to see that M ′ is an ILM-model. Lemma 2.5 and general knowledge
about ILM tells us that the generated submodel from l is a witness to the fact
that ILM 0 ✸A→ ✸B.5
(v). The ”⇐” direction is easy. For the other direction we reason as follows.6
We assume that 6⊢ A ✄ B and set out to prove 6⊢
∧
✸Ai → A ✄ B. As
6⊢ A✄ B, we can find M, r  ¬(A ✄ B). By Lemma 2.5 we may assume that r
is a root of M . For all i, we assumed 6⊢ ¬Ai, whence we can find rooted models
Mi, ri  Ai. As in the other cases, we define a model M˜ that arises by gluing r
under all the ri. Clearly we now see that M˜, r 
∧
✸Ai ∧ ¬(A✄B).
(vi). First, suppose that ILM ⊢ ✷⊥ → A. Then, from ILM ⊢ ✷⊥∨✸⊤, the
observation that ILM ⊢ ✸⊤ ↔ ✸✷⊥ and our assumption, we get ILM ⊢ A∨✸A.
For the other direction, we suppose that ILM 6⊢ ✷⊥ → A. Thus, we have
a counter model M and some m ∈ M with m  ✷⊥,¬A. Clearly, at the
submodel generated from m, that is, a single point, we see that ¬A ∧ ✷¬A
holds. Consequently ILM¬ ⊢ A ∨✸A.
(vii). This follows immediately from (vi) and (iii).
Note that, as ILM is conservative over GL, all of the above statements not
involving ✄ also hold for GL. The same holds for derived statements. For
example, from Lemma 3.10 we can combine (iii) and (iv) to obtain ILM ⊢ A→
B ∨✸B ⇔ ILM ⊢ ✸A→ ✸B. Consequently, the same holds true for GL.
3.4 Decidability
It is well known that ILM has the finite model property. It is not hard to re-use
worlds in the presented construction method so that we would end up with a
5This proof is similar to the proof of (iii). However, it is not the case that one of the two
follows easily from the other.
6By a similar reasoning we can prove ⊢
∧
¬(Ci ✄Di)→ A✄ B ⇔⊢ A✄B.
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finite counter model. Actually, this is precisely what has been done in [18]. In
that paper, one of the invariants was “there are no deficiencies”. We have chosen
not to include this invariant in our presentation, as this omission simplifies the
presentation. Moreover, for our purposes the completeness without the finite
model property obtained via our construction method suffices.
Our purpose to include a new proof of the well known completeness of ILM
is twofold. On the one hand the new proof serves well to expose the construction
method. On the other hand, it is an indispensable ingredient in proving Theorem
4.5.
4 Essentially Σ1-sentences of ILM
In this section we will answer the question which modal interpretability senten-
ces are in theories T provably Σ1 for any realization. We call these sentences
essentially Σ1-sentences. We shall answer the question only for T an essentially
reflexive theory.
This question has been solved for provability logics by Visser in [31]. In [7],
de Jongh and Pianigiani gave an alternative solution by using the logic ILM.
Our proof shall use their proof method.
We will perform our argument fully in ILM. It is very tempting to think that
our result would be an immediate corollary from for example [11], [17] or [16].
This would be the case, if a construction method were worked out for the logics
from these respective papers. In [11] a sort of a construction method is indeed
worked out. This construction method should however be a bit sharpened to
suit our purposes. Moreover that sharpening would essentially reduce to the
solution we present here.
4.1 Model construction
Throughout this subsection, unless mentioned otherwise, T will be an essentially
reflexive recursively enumerable arithmetical theory. By Theorem 3.1 we thus
know that IL(T) = ILM. Let us first say more precisely what we mean by an
essentially Σ1-sentence.
Definition 4.1. A modal sentence ϕ is called an essentially Σ1-sentence with
respect to a theory T , if ∀ ∗ ϕ∗ ∈ Σ1(T ). Likewise, a formula ϕ is essentially
∆1 if ∀ ∗ ϕ
∗ ∈ ∆1(T )
If ϕ is an essentially Σ1-formula for T we will also write ϕ ∈ Σ1(T ). Ana-
logously for ∆1(T ). For the rest of this section, T will always be a theory
that has ILM as its interpretability logic thereby making explicit reference to
T unnecessary as we shall see.
Theorem 4.2. Modulo modal logical equivalence, there exist just two essentially
∆1-formulas in the language of ILM. That is, ∆1(T ) = {⊤,⊥}.
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Bewijs. Let ϕ be a modal formula. If ϕ ∈ ∆1(T ), then, by provably Σ1-
completeness, both ∀ ∗ T ⊢ δ∗ → ✷δ∗ and ∀ ∗ T ⊢ ¬δ∗ → ✷¬δ∗. Consequently
∀ ∗ T ⊢ ✷δ∗ ∨✷¬δ∗. Thus, ∀ ∗ T ⊢ (✷δ ∨✷¬δ)∗ whence ILM ⊢ ✷δ ∨✷¬δ. By
Lemma 3.10 we see that ILM ⊢ δ or ILM ⊢ ¬δ.
We proved Theorem 4.2 for the interpretability logic of essentially reflexive
theories. It is not hard to see that the theorem also holds for finitely axiomatiza-
ble theories. The only ingredients that we need to prove this are [ILP ⊢ ✷A∨✷B
iff. ILP ⊢ ✷A or ILP ⊢ ✷B] and [ILP ⊢ ✷A iff. ILP ⊢ A]. As these two admis-
sible rules also hold for GL, we see that Theorem 4.2 also holds for GL.
The following lemma is the only arithmetical ingredient in our classification
of the essentially Σ1 formulas in the language of ILM.
Lemma 4.3. If ϕ ∈ Σ1(T ), then, for any p and q, we have ILM ⊢ p ✄ q →
p ∧ ϕ✄ q ∧ ϕ.
Before we come to prove the main theorem of this section, we first need an
additional lemma.
Lemma 4.4. Let ∆0 and ∆1 be maximal ILM-consistent sets. There is a
maximal ILM-consistent set Γ such that Γ ≺ ∆0,∆1.
Bewijs. We show that Γ′ := {✸A | A ∈ ∆0} ∪ {✸B | B ∈ ∆1} is consistent.
Assume for a contradiction that Γ′ were not consistent. Then, by compactness,
for finitely many Ai and Bj ,∧
Ai∈∆0
✸Ai ∧
∧
Bj∈∆1
✸Bj ⊢ ⊥
or equivalently
⊢
∨
Ai∈∆0
✷¬Ai ∨
∨
Bj∈∆1
✷¬Bj .
By Lemma 3.10 we see that then either ⊢ ¬Ai for some i, or ⊢ ¬Bj for some j.
This contradicts the consistency of ∆0 and ∆1.
With this lemma and by postponing the hard work to Subsectionsubs:sigmaLemma
we can now prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 4.5. ϕ ∈ Σ1(T )⇔ ILM ⊢ ϕ↔
∨
i∈I ✷Ci for some {Ci}i∈I .
Bewijs. Let ϕ be a formula that is not equivalent to a disjunction of ✷-formulas.
According to Lemma 4.7 we can find MCS’s ∆0 and ∆1 with ϕ ∈ ∆0 ⊆✷ ∆1 ∋
¬ϕ. By Lemma 4.4 we find a Γ ≺ ∆0,∆1. We define:
G := 〈{m0, l, r}, {〈m0, l〉, 〈m0, r〉}, {〈m0, l, r〉}, {〈m0,Γ〉, 〈l,∆0〉, 〈r,∆1〉}〉.
We will apply a slightly generalized version of the main lemma to this quasi-
ILM-frame G. The finite set D of sentences is the smallest set of sentences that
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contains ϕ and that is closed under taking subformulas and single negations.
The invariants are the following.
I :=
{
xRy ∧ x 6= m0 → ∃A∈((ν(y) \ ν(x)) ∩ {✷D | D ∈ D})
uSxvRw → uRw
In the proof of Theorem 3.9 we have seen that we can eliminate both problems
and deficiencies while conserving the invariants. The main lemma now gives us
an ILM-model M with M, l  ϕ, M, r  ¬ϕ and lSm0r. We now pick two fresh
variables p and q. We define p to be true only at l and q only at r. Clearly
m0  ¬(p✄ q → p ∧ ϕ✄ q ∧ ϕ), whence by Lemma 4.3 we get ϕ /∈ Σ1(T ).
For finitely axiomatized theories T , our theorem does not hold, as also A✄B
is T -essentially Σ1. The following theorem says that in this case, A✄B is under
any T -realization actually equivalent to a special Σ1-sentence.
Theorem 4.6. Let T be a finitely axiomatized theory. For all arithmetical
formulae α, β there exists a formula ρ with
T ⊢ α✄T β ↔ ✷Tρ.
Bewijs. The proof is a direct corollary of the so-called FGH-theorem. (See [33]
for an exposition of the FGH-theorem.) We take ρ satisfying the following fixed
point equation.
T ⊢ ρ↔ ((α✄T β) ≤ ✷Tρ)
By the proof of the FGH-theorem, we now see that
T ⊢ ((α ✄T β) ∨ ✷T⊥)↔ ✷Tρ.
But clearly T ⊢ ((α✄T β) ∨ ✷T⊥)↔ α✄T β.
4.2 The Σ-lemma
We can say that the proof of Theorem 4.5 contained three main ingredients;
Firstly, the main lemma; Secondly the modal completeness theorem for ILM
via the construction method and; Thirdly the Σ-lemma. In this subsection we
will prove the Σ-lemma and remark that it is in a sense optimal.
Lemma 4.7. If ϕ is a formula not equivalent to a disjunction of ✷-formulas.
Then there exist maximal ILX-consistent sets ∆0, ∆1 such that ϕ ∈ ∆0 ⊆✷
∆1 ∋ ¬ϕ.
Bewijs. As we shall see, the reasoning below holds not only for ILX, but for
any extension of GL. We define
✷∨ := {
∨
0≤i<n
✷Di | n ≥ 0, each Di an ILX-formula},
✷con := {Y ⊆ ✷∨ | {¬ϕ}+ Y is consistent and maximally such}.
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Let us first observe a useful property of the sets Y in ✷con.
n−1∨
i=0
σi ∈ Y ⇒ ∃ i<n σi ∈ Y. (1)
To see this, let Y ∈ ✷con and
∨n−1
i=0 σi ∈ Y . Then for each i<n we have σi ∈
✷∨ and for some i<n we must have σi consistent with Y (otherwise {¬ϕ}+ Y
would prove
∧n−1
i=0 ¬σi and be inconsistent). And thus by the maximality of Y
we must have that some σi is in Y . This establishes (1).
Claim 1. For some Y ∈ ✷con the set
{ϕ}+ {¬σ | σ ∈ ✷∨ − Y }
is consistent.
Proof of the claim. Suppose the claim were false. We will derive a contradiction
with the assumption that ϕ is not equivalent to a disjunction of ✷-formulas. If
the claim is false, then we can choose for each Y ∈ ✷con a finite set Y
fin ⊆ ✷∨−Y
such that
{ϕ}+ {¬σ | σ ∈ Y fin} (2)
is inconsistent. Thus, certainly for each Y ∈ ✷con
⊢ ϕ→
∨
σ∈Y fin
σ. (3)
Now we will show that:
{¬ϕ}+ {
∨
σ∈Y fin
σ | Y ∈ ✷con} is inconsistent. (4)
For, suppose (4) were not the case. Then for some S ∈ ✷con
{
∨
σ∈Y fin
σ | Y ∈ ✷con} ⊆ S.
In particular we have
∨
σ∈Sfin σ ∈ S. But for all σ ∈ S
fin we have σ 6∈ S. Now
by (1) we obtain a contradiction and thus we have shown (4).
So we can select some finite ✷fincon ⊆ ✷con such that
⊢ (
∧
Y ∈✷fin
con
∨
σ∈Y fin
σ)→ ϕ. (5)
By (3) we also have
⊢ ϕ→
∧
Y ∈✷fin
con
∨
σ∈Y fin
σ. (6)
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Combining (5) with (6) we get
⊢ ϕ↔
∧
Y ∈✷fin
con
∨
σ∈Y fin
σ.
Bringing the right hand side of this equivalence in disjunctive normal form and
distributing the ✷ over ∧ we arrive at a contradiction with the assumption on
ϕ.
So, we have for some Y ∈ ✷con that both the sets
{ϕ}+ {¬σ | σ ∈ ✷∨ − Y } (7)
{¬ϕ} + Y (8)
are consistent. The lemma follows by taking ∆0 and ∆1 extending (7) and (8)
respectively.
We have thus obtained ϕ ∈ ∆0 ⊆✷ ∆1 ∋ ¬ϕ for some maximal ILX-
consistent sets ∆0 and ∆1. The relation ⊆✷ between ∆0 and ∆1 is actually
the best we can get among the relations on MCS’s that we consider in this
paper. We shall see that ∆0 ≺ ∆1 is not possible to get in general.
It is obvious that that p∧✷p is not equivalent to a disjunction of ✷-formulas.
Clearly p ∧ ✷p ∈ ∆0 ≺ ∆1 ∋ ¬p ∨ ✸¬p is impossible. In a sense, this reflects
the fact that there exist non trivial self-provers, as was shown by Kent ([21]),
Guaspari ([12]) and Beklemishev ([2]). Thus, provable Σ1-completeness, that is
T ⊢ σ → ✷σ for σ ∈ Σ1(T ), can not substitute Lemma 4.3.
5 Self provers and Σ1-sentences
A self prover is a sentence ϕ that implies its own provability. That is, a sentence
for which ⊢ ϕ → ✷ϕ, or equivalently, ⊢ ϕ ↔ ϕ ∧ ✷ϕ. Self provers have been
studied intensively amongst others by Kent ([21]), Guaspari ([12]), de Jongh
and Pianigiani ([7]). It is easy to see that any Σ1(T )-sentence is indeed a self
prover. We shall call such a self prover a trivial self prover.
In [12], Guaspari has shown that there are many non-trivial self provers
around. The most prominent example is probably p ∧ ✷p. But actually, any
formula ϕ will generate a self prover ϕ ∧✷ϕ, as clearly ϕ ∧✷ϕ→ ✷(ϕ ∧ ✷ϕ).
Definition 5.1. A formula ϕ is called a trivial self prover generator, we shall
write t.s.g., if ϕ ∧ ✷ϕ is a trivial self prover. That is, if ϕ ∧ ✷ϕ ∈ Σ1(T ).
Obviously, a trivial self prover is also a t.s.g. But there also exist other
t.s.g.’s. The most prominent example is probably ✷✷p→ ✷p. A natural ques-
tion is to ask for an easy characterization of t.s.g.’s. In this section we will give
such a characterization for GL. All results presented here are new results. In
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the rest of this section, ⊢ will stand for derivability in GL. We shall often write
Σ instead of Σ1.
We say that a formula ψ is Σ in GL, and write Σ(ψ), if for any theory T
which has GL as its provability logic, we have that ∀ ∗ ψ∗ ∈ Σ1(T ).
Theorem 5.2. We have that Σ(ϕ ∧ ✷ϕ) in GL if and only if the following
condition is satisfied.
For all formulae Al, ϕl and Cm satisfying 1, 2 and 3 we have that ⊢ ϕ∧✷ϕ↔∨∨
m✷Cm. Here 1-3 are the following conditions.
1. ⊢ ϕ↔
∨∨
l(ϕl ∧ ✷Al) ∨
∨∨
m✷Cm
2. 6⊢ ✷Al → ϕ for all l
3. ϕl is a non-empty conjunction of literals and ✸-formulas.
Bewijs. The ⇐ direction is the easiest part. We can always find an equivalent
of ϕ that satisfies 1, 2 and 3. Thus, by assumption, ϕ ∧ ✷ϕ can be written as
the disjunction of ✷-formulas and hence Σ(ϕ ∧✷ϕ).
For the ⇒ direction we reason as follows. Suppose we can find ϕl, Al and
Cm such that 1, 2 and 3 hold, but
6⊢ ϕ ∧ ✷ϕ↔
∨∨
m
✷Cm. (∗)
We can take now T = PA and reason as follows. As clearly ⊢
∨∨
m✷Cm →
ϕ ∧ ✷ϕ, our assumption (∗) reduces to 6⊢ ϕ ∧ ✷ϕ →
∨∨
m✷Cm. Consequently∨∨
l(ϕl ∧ ✷Al) can not be empty, and for some l and some rooted GL-model
M, r with root r, we have M, l  ✷Al ∧ ϕl.
We shall now see that 6⊢ ¬ϕ∧✷ϕ→ ✸¬Al. For, suppose for a contradiction
that
⊢ ¬ϕ ∧ ✷ϕ→ ✸¬Al.
Then also ⊢ ✷Al → (✷ϕ → ϕ), whence ⊢ ✷Al → ✷(✷ϕ → ϕ) → ✷ϕ. And
by ✷Al → (✷ϕ → ϕ) again, we get ⊢ ✷Al → ϕ which contradicts 2. We must
conclude that indeed 6⊢ ¬ϕ∧✷ϕ→ ✸¬Al, and thus we have a rooted tree model
N, r for GL with N, r  ¬ϕ,✷ϕ,✷Al.
We can now “glue” a world w below l and r, set lSwr and consider the
smallest ILM-model extending this. We have depicted this construction in
Figure 1. Let us also give a precise definition. If M := 〈W0, R0,0〉 and
N := 〈W1, R1,1〉, then we define
L := 〈W0 ∪W1, R0 ∪R1 ∪ {〈w, x〉 | x ∈ W0 ∪W1} ∪ {〈l, y〉 | N |= rRy},
{〈w, l, r〉} ∪ {〈x, y, z〉 | L |= xRyR∗z},0 ∪ 1〉.
We observe that, by Lemma 2.5 L, r  ✷ϕ∧✷Al∧¬ϕ and L |= rRx⇒ L, x  ϕ∧
Al. Also, if L |= lRx, then L, x  ϕ∧Ai, whence L, l  ✷ϕ∧✷Al. As M, l  ϕl
and ϕl only contains literals and and diamond-formulas, we see that L, l  ϕl,
whence L, l  ϕ ∧ ✷ϕ. As L, r  ¬ϕ ∧ ✷ϕ we see that L,w  ¬✷(ϕ ∧ ✷ϕ).
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Sw
w
M, l N, r
ϕ,✷ϕ,✷Al ¬ϕ,✷ϕ,✷Al
Figuur 1: T.s.g.’s
As in the proof of Theorem 4.5, we can take some fresh p and q and define
p to hold only at l and q to hold only at r. Now, clearly w 6 p✄ q → p ∧ (ϕ ∧
✷ϕ)✄ q ∧ (ϕ ∧ ✷ϕ), whence, by Lemma 4.3 we conclude ¬Σ(ϕ ∧ ✷ϕ).
The above reasoning showed that Σ(ϕ∧✷ϕ) is not a sufficient condition for
Σ(ϕ) to hold. We shall see that even Σ(ϕ ∧ ✷ϕ) ∧ Σ(ϕ ∧ ✷¬ϕ) is not a
sufficient condition for Σ(ϕ) to hold.
Thus, to conclude this section, we remain inGL and shall settle the question
for which ϕ we have that
Σ(ϕ ∧ ✷ϕ) & Σ(ϕ ∧ ✷¬ϕ)⇒ Σ(ϕ). (†)
We shall see that this question is non-trivial and that it can be reduced to the
characterization of t.s.g.’s. Again the easiest non-trivial example satisfying (†)
will be ✷✷p→ ✷p.
Lemma 5.3.
For some (possibly empty)
∨∨
i✷Ci we have ⊢ ϕ ∧ ✷¬ϕ↔
∨∨
i✷Ci
iff.
⊢ ✷⊥ → ϕ or ⊢ ¬ϕ
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Bewijs. For non-empty
∨∨
i✷Ci we have the following.
⊢ ϕ ∧✷¬ϕ↔
∨∨
i✷Ci ⇒
⊢ ✸(ϕ ∧✷¬ϕ)↔ ✸(
∨∨
i✷Ci) ⇒
⊢ ✸ϕ↔ ✸⊤ ⇒
⊢ ✷⊥ → ϕ
Here, the final step in the proof comes from Lemma 3.10.
On the other hand, if ⊢ ✷⊥ → ϕ, we see that ⊢ ¬ϕ → ✸⊤ and thus
✷¬ϕ→ ✷⊥, whence ⊢ ϕ ∧ ✷¬ϕ↔ ✷⊥.
In case of the empty disjunction we get ⊢ ϕ∧✷¬ϕ↔ ⊥. Then also ⊢ ✷¬ϕ→
¬ϕ and by Lo¨b ⊢ ¬ϕ. And conversely, if ⊢ ¬ϕ, then ⊢ ϕ ∧ ✷¬ϕ↔ ⊥, and ⊥ is
just the empty disjunction.
The proof actually gives some additional information. If Σ(ϕ ∧ ✷¬ϕ) then
either (⊢ ¬ϕ and ⊢ (ϕ∧✷¬ϕ)↔ ⊥), or (⊢ ✷⊥ → ϕ and ⊢ (ϕ∧✷¬ϕ)↔ ✷⊥).
Lemma 5.4.
Σ(ϕ ∧✷ϕ) ∧Σ(ϕ ∧ ✷¬ϕ)⇒ Σ(ϕ)
iff.
Σ(ϕ ∧ ✷ϕ)⇒ Σ(ϕ) or ⊢ ϕ→ ✸⊤
Bewijs. ⇑. Clearly, if Σ(ϕ∧✷ϕ)⇒ Σ(ϕ), also Σ(ϕ∧✷ϕ)∧Σ(ϕ∧✷¬ϕ) ⇒ Σ(ϕ).
Thus, suppose ⊢ ϕ → ✸⊤, or put differently ⊢ ✷⊥ → ¬ϕ. If now ⊢ ¬ϕ, then
clearly Σ(ϕ), whence Σ(ϕ ∧ ✷ϕ) ∧ Σ(ϕ ∧ ✷¬ϕ) ⇒ Σ(ϕ), so, we may assume
that 0 ¬ϕ. It is clear that now ¬Σ(ϕ ∧ ✷¬ϕ). For, suppose Σ(ϕ ∧ ✷¬ϕ),
then by Lemma 5.3 we see ⊢ ✷⊥ → ϕ, whence ⊢ ✸⊤. Quod non. Thus,
⊢ ✷⊥ → ¬ϕ⇒ ¬Σ(ϕ∧✷¬ϕ) and thus certainly Σ(ϕ∧✷ϕ)∧Σ(ϕ∧✷¬ϕ) ⇒ Σ(ϕ).
⇓. Suppose Σ(ϕ ∧ ✷ϕ) ∧ ¬Σ(ϕ) and 0 ✷⊥ → ¬ϕ. To obtain our result, we
only have to prove Σ(ϕ ∧ ✷¬ϕ).
As 0 ✷⊥ → ¬ϕ, also 0 ¬ϕ ∨ ✸¬ϕ. Thus, under the assumption that
Σ(ϕ∧✷ϕ), we can find (a non-empty collection of) Ci with ⊢ ϕ∧✷ϕ↔
∨∨
i✷Ci.
In this case, clearly ⊢ ✷⊥ →
∨∨
i✷Ci → ϕ, whence, by Lemma 5.3 we conclude
Σ(ϕ ∧ ✷¬ϕ).
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